When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker's knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.
Introduction
ask how the DM's welfare changes as the cost of sending cues-or proposing actions-falls and, consequently, more experts seek attention and more choices enter the picture. Initially, she benefits as she is offered more actions. But as entry becomes cheaper, it becomes profitable for experts who propose actions with a lesser appeal to enter. As a result, the average quality of the proposals deteriorates, and the DM must read cues, at a cost, to find the attractive ones. Eventually, as the supply escalates, screening ceases to be worthwhile, and she picks random proposals for deliberation.
Thus, at a certain point, as she gets more information, she processes less of it-or tunes out-and fares worse. I refer to this as information overload. Its immediate cause is that the quality of invitations to communicate decreases with the quantity; worthy topics become the proverbial needle in a haystack. The deeper cause, though, is negative externalities: Entry is individually rational for each expert, even as it complicates the selection problem for the DM and spoils overall communication. A DM with limited attention may hence want to limit access to her attention space, even if that reduces her choice set. She faces a trade-off between comprehensiveness and comprehensibility.
Section 3 continues the analysis with three one-expert settings. Even though there is only one expert, the DM still faces a multi-tasking problem, because the expert now communicates with her on several topics. The single-expert settings pick up on the previous results-crowding out and information overload-and show that a single expert may induce such outcomes. In the multiple-experts setting, these outcomes result from competition for attention. A single expert who communicates with the DM on multiple topics, however, may deliberately induce crowding out and information overload to divert attention away from a topic.
The starting point is to introduce the idea of an "inconvenient" topic, which arises naturally in this setting. If the DM is already inclined to take the action, the expert wants to minimize the chances that she learns more about it. To him, there is no upside; all that can happen is that she changes her mind and abandons the action. Hence, he wants to draw attention away from it.
A first simple tactic the expert can employ is to fabricate, advertise, and communicate about another topic. I show that he is willing to incur expenses to do so, even if the other topic is irrelevant to him-so long as it is of interest to the DM. The rationale is simply to raise the DM's marginal gain from paying attention to the other topic, and thereby to divert attention away from the inconvenient one. In short, he plays different topics off against each other to distract the DM.
In the second scenario, the DM is unsure which topics are relevant, that is, worth deliberation; in fact, she may even be unaware of some topics. In such a situation, the expert can conceal topics to keep the DM in the dark. In fact, if up to him, no inconvenient topic would be brought up. But sometimes the expert cannot or may not withhold such information. I show that, if this is the case, he is inclined to inundate the DM with mostly irrelevant topics.
This induces information overload and thus conceals inconvenient topics. In other words, the expert shares superfluous information to obfuscate the DM. This suggests that simple disclosure rules can be impotent. To have bite, laws may have to stipulate not only whether, but also how, information is disclosed.
Last, I consider a setting in which the DM's payoff from a single action comprises many components, and I allow the expert to manipulate that composition so long as the total payoff stays constant. If each component represents a topic, such payoff-equivalent variations amount to changing the number of relevant topics. This gives the expert yet another tactic to thwart learning. He can force the DM to understand more details of the action, or product, to grasp its total payoff; in other words, he can make it more complex. He can use this tactic to ensure that an increasing amount of relevant information slips her attention and, by the same token, that whatever she can learn in the deliberation stage is so trivial that it no longer affects her decision. Even if she fully understands all the topics she can manage to deliberate on, she will always do what she would have done anyway. Note that complexity can lead to obfuscation. But complexity is a more delicate issue for regulation: Unlike obfuscation, it cannot be tackled at the level of communication, information, and disclosure; it may call for intervention in product design.
To summarize, the key mechanism in this framework is attention substitution: More attention devoted to one topic is less devoted to another. Attention substitution allows an expert to take strategic actions to steer the DM's attention towards certain topics and away from others. His choice of persuasion effort on a topic in the deliberation stage, as well as his decision to advertise a topic in the selection stage, affects how much attention is seized from other topics. It is these strategies targeted at the DM's attention allocation that I refer to as attention manipulation.
To my knowledge, this paper presents the first economic model of attention manipulation.
It builds on and contributes to three strands of the economics literature.
First, I advance the recent work on two-sided communication as a moral-hazard-in-teams problem (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005) . Soft information can be misrepresented at no cost (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) ; hard information can be withheld but not misrepresented (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) . In Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) , the softness of information is intermediate and endogenous: Communication conveys hard information with a probability that depends on effort by both sides; otherwise, information remains soft. 4 I extend 4 As Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) point out, moral hazard in teams arises even when the expert and the DM have perfectly aligned preferences, as in the literature on team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; Radner, 1992; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994) . In the tradition of modeling the choice of communication type as endogenous, Loginova (2011) considers a choice between the two polar cases of soft and hard. Introducing a lying cost represents another way to bridge soft and hard information (see, e.g., Kartik et al., 2007; Kartik, 2009). their framework by introducing multiple experts, or topics, that vie for the DM's attention.
Competition for attention leads to attention substitution. This in turn invites attention manipulation.
Second, I introduce a novel strategic aspect to the literature on rational inattention. The existing literature analyzes how a DM allocates her limited attention among many passive sources of information (e.g., Sims, 2003; Wiederholt, 2010) . I allow the sources to be active by introducing senders who make communication (effort) choices, and in so doing expose a hitherto neglected aspect of rational inattention: Providers of information may strategically influence how the DM allocates her limited attention. 5 My paper also relates to Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012), who build on Bordalo et al (2012) and model to which attributes an individual's attention is drawn when it is limited: attention is unproportionally allocated to salient issues. I instead focus on how, when individuals have limited attention, market participants' strategically take actions to make a certain attribute of a good salient or invisible, depending on whether the market participant wants to conceal or emphasize the attribute. Put differenly, I allow interested parties to influence the relative salience of a product's attributes.
Third, my paper is related to a number of studies that examine how a DM communicates with multiple experts or with a single expert on multiple topics. Krishna and Morgan (2001) , Battaglini (2002) , and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) study competing experts in a soft information setting. In contrast, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Gentzkow and Kamenica (2011) study competing experts in a hard information setting, and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007, 2010) study soft communication between a DM and one expert on several topics. In these papers, competition or multiplicity never reduces the amount of knowledge the DM gains. Key to the result in my paper that more information can reduce the DM's knowledge is that experts manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the DM's attention allocation. This suggests that limits to attention are important for whether individuals stand to benefit from more competitive, or greater, information supply. 6
Following each theoretical result, I discuss practical examples and cite relevant empirical evidence.
5 This highlights the key difference between standard rational inattention models and multitasking models in the vein of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . In the latter, the appeal of directing effort or attention to a specific task is shaped by counterparties (for example, through an incentive contract), and hence is endogenous.
6 In these models, all the experts have information relevant to the same action.
In contrast, I also analyze a case in which each expert has information about a different action. This relates my paper to a literature in organizational design in which multiple division managers communicate local information to a central management (Dessein and Santos, 2006; Alonso et al., 2008) . This literature, however, deals with neither limited attention on part of the DM nor competition for such.
Multiple Experts
In this section, I introduce the multiple expert setting and analyze, in turn, the deliberation stage and the selection stage.
Crowding Out
I introduce multiple senders into the framework proposed by Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) .
A DM faces two simultaneous decisions, i = 1, 2. 7 Each decision i concerns whether to take a distinct action, A i . For each decision, there is a distinct expert who gets a deterministic payoff d > 0 if the DM takes the action, and zero otherwise. The DM's payoffx i from A i takes the valuex > 0 with probability α i and otherwise the value x < 0. The probability α i is common knowledge. The larger the α i , the more attractive A i seems to the DM, and the more aligned are her interests with those of the expert vested in A i . Everyone is risk-neutral.
In the absence of additional information, the DM takes A i if and only if its expected payoff is positive:
x−x . 8 Before making any decision, the DM can learn more about the actions. For each action, the vested expert can provide information, and the DM can devote attention to processing this information. Through such communication, the DM can learn the realization ofx i . The expert himself knows neither whetherx i =x orx i = x nor whether the (truthful) information he provides will help the DM find out. Nevertheless, his information may persuade the DM to take A i even though α i < α * , since the DM may find out thatx i =x. The probability that the DM learnsx i is given by p (s i , r i ), where s i and r i are, respectively, the expert's effort to communicate about A i and the attention that the DM devotes to learning about A i .
Assumption The function p (s i , r i ) is twice continuously differentiable on [0, 1] 2 , with p (0, 0) = 0 and p (1, 1) = 1. It is strictly concave and satisfies
6 the DM's return from paying attention is higher when the expert makes a greater effort to explain. 10 The formulation encompasses communication technologies with the property p (0, r i ) = 0: Even if an expert makes no effort to transmit information to the DM, it is possible for her to find the relevant information by herself.
Communication is costly to both parties. The DM's attention is scarce, i r i ≤ 1, so the cost is attention substitution: Paying more attention to one action necessarily comes at the expense of others. An expert's cost of persuasion effort is given by c (s i ).
Assumption The function c (s i ) is twice continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and satisfies c (·) > 0 and c (·) > 0, as well as the Inada conditions c (·) → 0 as s i → 0, and c (·) → ∞ as
The persuasion efforts and the attention allocation are chosen simultaneously and noncooperatively. I refer to the above game as the deliberation stage.
I determine the Nash equilibrium for this game, and then analyze how the experts affect each other in equilibrium.
, there is a unique equilibrium (r * 1 , s * 1 , s * 2 ), which is interior. If
An expert's behavior hinges on whether the DM uses an opt-in rule or an opt-out rule for the decision he is vested in. When α i ≤ α * , the DM uses an opt-in rule with respect to A i .
Her default is not to take A i , but she departs from this default-opts in-if she learns that x i =x. Hence, expert i has an incentive to communicate with her. Thus, when α 1 , α 2 ≤ α * , each expert solves
and the DM's problem is
In the unique equilibrium, both experts communicate, and the DM pays attention to both.
The Inada condition rules out corners; global concavity of p (s i , r i ) guarantees uniqueness.
In contrast, when α i > α * , the receiver uses an opt-out rule with respect to A i . Her default is to take A i , but she departs from this default-opts out-if she learns thatx i =x. 
In the unique equilibrium, expert 1 exerts effort, expert 2 is passive, and the DM communicates with expert 1 about A 1 and devotes some attention to acquiring information about A 2 . The distinction between one-sided and two-sided communication arises endogenously.
How well an expert fares in the deliberation stage not only depends on how attractive his own action seems to the DM, but also on the other expert's attractiveness.
Proposition 1 (Crowding out). Fix expert 2's attractiveness, α 2 . If expert 2 wants the DM's attention (α 2 ≤ α * ), his expected utility is a strictly decreasing function of the attention given to expert 1, r * 1 (α 1 ). If expert 2 does not want the DM's attention (α 2 > α * ), his expected utility is a strictly increasing function of the attention given to expert 1, r * 1 (α 1 ).
As r * 2 (α 1 ) = 1−r * 1 (α 1 ), a change in α 1 that causes the DM to pay more attention to expert 1 in equilibrium crowds out attention to expert 2. When expert 2 wants the DM's attention, this crowding out harms him; otherwise, it benefits him. Thus, the presence of expert 1 imposes a negative or positive externality on expert 2, and the size of this externality is captured by r * 1 (α 1 ).
Corollary 1. Fix expert 2's attractiveness, α 2 . Expert 2's expected utility is non-monotonic in the attractiveness of expert 1, α 1 .
This follows from the fact that the attention the DM devotes to expert 1 in equilibrium, r * 1 (α 1 ), is nonmonotonic in α 1 : r * 1 (α 1 ) increases for α 1 ∈ (0, α * ), falls at α * , and decreases for α 1 ∈ (α * , 1). If expert 2 wants the DM's attention (α 2 ≤ α * ), EU S 2 (α 1 ) is negatively related to r * 1 (α j ); otherwise, the reverse holds. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Similarly, in a recent incident-dubbed Speechgate-President Barack Obama scheduled an important speech to Congress for the same day on which Republican candidates, hosted by MSNBC and Politico, were set to have a presidential election debate. This caused a quarrel.
As a Washington Post blog pointed out, the main issue was crowding out:
[S]cheduling the speech during the GOP debate, even if Boehner had immediately acceded, is the one way the White House could guarantee a) that fewer voters would be watching and that b) viewers and pundits would pay less attention to the speech's content and more to the theatrics around it. In other words, it's the easiest way to lessen the speech's chances at success. 12
Such issues arise because public attention-or media coverage for that matter-is limited;
what makes front page news shapes not only public opinion but also determines its agenda.
For example, Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) document that natural disasters that concur with major sports events elicit less relief aid because they are crowded out in the news.
In the above examples, crowding out represents a negative externality. This is not always the case: Those who shun attention on certain topics can certainly benefit from crowding out. The assumption that the DM can only devote attention to t topics can, in this context, be thought of as a lower bound r on the amount of (nonzero) attention that the DM can devote to any one topic, ri ∈ {0} ∪ [r, 1] for all i. This limits the number of topics she can communicate with to t ≡ t (r) ∈ N. This assumption is appealing in the presence of a large number of topics; in practice, it is not possible to devote only a split second to each of (infinitely) many sources. The choice of t = 2 is merely one of convenience; I show in the Proof of Proposision 2 that all results go through for any finite t.
To capture this, I add a selection stage in which the DM must select at most two experts for the deliberation stage. N = Nᾱ + N α experts can enter the competition to be selected. Of these,
Nᾱ propose actions of high quality (α =ᾱ ≤ α * ) and N α of low quality (α = α <ᾱ). Nᾱ > t is finite; N α is infinite. I set parameters such that all experts want attention, α <ᾱ < α * .
Each expert's quality is his private information. Hence, an expert may be willing to signal the quality of his action if it helps him get selected, and the DM may be willing to read such signals before choosing which actions to deliberate on, that is, which experts to communicate with. I allow for this in the form of cue communication, as in Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) :
At cost q S > 0, an expert can send a cue that contains hard information about the quality of his action. Upon receiving a cue, the DM decides whether to process it, at cost q R > 0, to learn the action's quality. No expert can be selected without having sent a cue; hence, q S can be thought of as an entry cost. As I explain below, this last assumption is not crucial.
I solve this game, deliberation stage plus selection stage, for perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Furthermore, I focus on the equilibria favored by the DM, that is, those with the maximum number of high-quality entrants.
As would be expected, when the cost of entry decreases, the supply of experts-and hence the number of actions the DM can choose among-increases. Proposition 2 states a key result:
As the DM's choice set grows, communication first improves but then deteriorates.
Proposition 2 (Information overload). As q S → 0, the DM receives more cues but eventually processes less. Her expected utility first increases and then decreases.
It is instructive to describe how equilibrium behavior in the selection stage changes as the cost of sending cues, q S , falls from prohibitively large to negligibly small. In the beginning, cues are so expensive that no expert enters. As q S falls, it becomes attractive for some high-quality experts to enter. Here, the cues in themselves are a signal of high quality, so the DM need not process them but selects her communication partner(s) for the deliberation stage from the pool of entrants at random. 15 In this signaling outcome, the DM's welfare increases as q S falls so long as the number of entrants is smaller than two-or more generally, smaller than the number of experts she can communicate with in the deliberation stage; otherwise, it is constant.
As q S falls further, some low-quality experts find it attractive to enter as well. A signaling equilibrium, in which a random pick from among the entrants ensures a high-quality expert for the deliberation stage, no longer exists. The DM reacts in either of two ways: Either she continues to randomize and simply accepts the lower (average) expert quality or, if q R is not too high, she reads cues with positive probability to screen out low-quality experts. So as not to make the selection stage trivial, I focus on q R low enough for the DM to engage in active screening. Clearly, her welfare decreases as q S falls, as it becomes harder to spot high quality. Already, the arrival of more cues-essentially, access to more information-makes the DM worse off. The next stage is merely the copestone.
As q S vanishes, the avalanche of low-quality cues reduces the average quality in the entrant pool so much that screening becomes futile-high quality becomes the proverbial needle in the haystack. As a result, there is neither signaling nor screening, just pooling: the DM gives up on active selection and accepts that she is all but bound to meet low quality in the deliberation stage. I refer to this phenomenon-the more cues the DM gets, the less she processes, and the worse she fares-as information overload. 16
If I instead assume that the DM cannot observe that a cue was sent unless she assimilates it, the economic insights remain: She must open exactly two cues so long as only high-quality experts enter; then, she must either open exactly two cues but rely on information of lower quality, or open more than two cues on average to identify two high-quality experts. In either case, her expected utility remains constant when only high types enter and decreases with the number of low types.
Figure 2 here
Further, the equilibria described above exist even if we relax the assumption that an expert must send a cue to enter. However, in that case, there is a further equilibrium for q S → 0 in which the experts cease to send cues, aware that they are no longer processed, and the DM picks randomly from the entire pool of experts. Still, the DM favors the equilibrium in which she picks randomly from a subset of experts-which includes all high-quality experts-that send a cue, because it offers better odds of picking a high-quality expert.
Also, we need not assume differences in quality. Instead, suppose experts invest in quality.
Specifically, suppose all N experts begin with low quality (α = α) but can invest in high quality (α =ᾱ) at some cost c > 0 before entering. Proposition 2 implies that information overload frustrates investment in high quality. Intuitively, the value of quality is reflected in the expected utility difference between a high and a low type. For prohibitive q S , both types expect to earn zero, so there is no incentive to invest in quality. As q S falls, if c is not too high, some invest in quality and send cues. But as q S → 0, information overload erodes the premium on quality, so again no one invests. The supply of high quality collapses when it becomes too cheap to approach the DM. This is not because the DM ceases to value quality.
On the contrary, she would like to treat high-quality experts preferentially; however, she in unable to do so when finding them amounts to looking for a needle in a haystack.
It is instructive to make precise how (the idea of) information overload is related to (the idea of) limited attention. To this end, consider this quote by Simon (1971) :
What information consumes is rather obvious: It consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it. [p. [40] [41] Thus, attention, in limited supply, becomes a scarcer resource in relative terms when confronted with more information. But this does not imply information overload or that more information provided can decrease knowledge attained. The idea of information overload is that a wealth of information not only "creates. . . a need to allocate that attention" (emphasis added) but actually impairs the ability to do so efficiently.
Last but not least, note that information overload in this setting arises due to externalities:
Each expert ignores how his own entry affects the communication environment as a whole.
If the expert were identical for all actions, he would only send cues for two high-quality actions. In the decentralized setting, however, sending cues remains individually rational even as each cue sent aggravates the complexity of the DM's selection problem up to a point where active selection breaks down. This, in turn, frustrates the incentives to produce quality.
It is as if the low-quality experts, each seeking to be noticed, pollute the DM's attention field.
Indeed, information overload is similar to pollution or congestion, and like them, amenable to efficiency-improving intervention.
Example: Information Overload Redux Recent advances in information technology have rapidly increased information production, duplication, and transmission. People face massive data via more channels (phone, Internet, email, instant messages, etc.) and on more platforms (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc.) . In the presence of information overload-also referred to as information deluge, cognitive overload, or information pollution-such an abundance of information can be confusing and counterproductive.
A business research firm nominated information overload as the "problem of the year"
for 2008, and claimed that it caused "a $650 Billion drag on the economy" by way of "lost productivity and innovation." A productivity study at Intel estimates "the impact of information overload on each knowledge worker at up to eight hours a week." The main concern is that an escalating quantity of information comes with a declining average quality and that this inverse relationship between amount and relevance-that is, a decreasing signal-to-noiseratio-makes it harder to find "good" information. Some of them are already in the business of dealing with it, by designing technological solutions for information selection. Google's success formula, its ranking algorithm, is preselection. And its ubiquity in the Internet, as gateway and gatekeeper, betrays the import of information overload. 19 The logic of pre-selection also underlies solutions such as email filters. While spam filters are now standard in most email programs, there are more advanced software solutions, such as ranking inbox messages by imputed importance, compiling communication histories for every sender, displaying email portions to allow for fast screening, and sophisticated filing and search functions. Such ranking of electronic messages minimizes information overload; that is, it reduces the "economic loss associated with the examination of a number of non-or less-relevant messages" and distinguishes "communications that are probably of interest from those that probably aren't" (Losee, 1998).
Information overload is not just a matter of Internet and emails. It can arise in a variety of decision situations, and leads to poor decision-making. In a seminal study, Jacoby et al. (1974) explore how the quality of consumption decisions depends on "information load," measured as number of brands as well as amount of information per brand provided. Their experiment with 192 subjects shows that the ability to pick the best product dropped off at high levels of information load. In Jacoby et al. (1973), a companion paper, they further
show that the subjects spent less time on processing information-or in their words, tuned out-once the information load exceeded a certain threshold. Also, both papers report that how information is organized on package displays affects decision quality. O'Reilly (1980) documents similar effects with respect to decision-making in organizations, and stresses the role of organizing communication. Similarly, (Iyengar, 2011) provides empirical evidence that a reduction in choices can benefit decision-makers. Many other experiments in organization science, accounting, marketing, and information science corroborate the notion that more information can impair cognitive processes and decisions (Edmunds and Morris, 2000; Eppler and Mengis, 2004 All of the above examples suggest that decision-makers can benefit from receiving less information, despite the associated decrease in freedom. Indeed, in the presence of information overload, there is a trade-off between variety and simplicity, or between comprehensiveness and comprehensibility. But this evidence contrasts with models of decision-making under unlimited attention, where a larger choice set cannot make an individual worse off.
One expert
In the previous section, crowding out and information overload result from the strategic interaction between multiple experts. In this section, I change the previous model in various ways to study a single expert who has incentives to suppress communication. I formalize three forms of attention manipulation: In the first two, distraction and obfuscation, the expert induces crowding out and information overload. In the third, he varies the complexity of the action, keeping its expected payoff constant, only to manipulate communication.
Distraction
Like before, the DM considers two actions, A 1 and A 2 . But she now faces only one expert.
The expert chooses efforts s 1 and s 2 to communicate with the DM about the two actions at cost c (s 1 ) + c (s 2 ). I further change the sequence of moves in the deliberation stage: The expert chooses his persuasion effort(s) first, whereas the DM chooses her attention allocation after observing the expert's efforts. In the selection stage, the expert can send a cue at cost q S ≥ 0, and the DM incurs q R ≥ 0 to process a cue. For simplicity, let q R = 0. 21 In addition, I entertain the possibility that only one action exists at the outset but that the expert can "fabricate" A 2 at cost f > 0.
To set the stage for distraction, I restrict attention to the case in which the expert deems A 1 an inconvenient topic: The expert wants the action taken (d 1 > 0), but because α 1 > α * , he wishes no exchange of information about it. In fact, he wants the DM to devote as little 20 Studying retirement savings plans in the United States, ? show that making the problem less complex-a multidimensional problem was collapsed into a binary choice-increases enrollment in the plan. That is, simplification renders active participation more attractive. In a similar study, Choi et al. (2011) report that sending short email cues that draw attention to selective details of the savings program significantly affects participation. 21 This assumption is not crucial, as I explain below.
14 attention as possible to A 1 . By contrast, I assume that A 2 is irrelevant to the expert (d 2 = 0).
With no stake in A 2 , he has no direct reason to communicate about it or to fabricate it.
Proposition 3 (Distraction). The expert (i) fabricates A 2 for some f > 0, (ii) sends cues about A 2 , if he privately observes α 2 ∈ {α,ᾱ}, for some q S > 0, and (iii) chooses s 2 > 0.
To see this, consider first the subgame perfect equilibrium of the deliberation stage. The expert exerts no effort on the inconvenient topic, s 1 = 0, but may exert effort on the irrelevant topic, s 2 ≥ 0. When the DM chooses her attention allocation, she knows the expert's efforts.
Thus, she solves
The first-order condition is
Because p 12 > 0, the DM finds it optimal to put more attention on A 2 -that is, to increase 1 − r 1 , or equivalently, to decrease r 1 -when s 2 is larger. The solution to the DM's problem, r * 1 (s 2 , α 1 , α 2 ), will thus be decreasing in s 2 :
< 0. This means that the expert can manipulate the attention given to the inconvenient topic, A 1 , by varying his effort on the irrelevant topic, s 2 . His problem is
We see where the expert's incentive to increase s 2 comes from: He can reduce the attention that the DM pays to A 1 , r * 1 (s 2 , α 1 , α 2 ), and thereby the probability that the DM opts out of
The left-hand side is positive. Thus, s 2 > 0.
Next, suppose the expert privately knows whether α 2 = α or α 2 =ᾱ, and consider the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with the selection stage. Note from the first-order condition of the DM's problem that the DM puts more attention on A 2 when α 2 is larger.
Thus,
< 0. This gives the expert an incentive to reveal α 2 =ᾱ and conceal α 2 = α. Clearly, for low enough q S , there exists a fully revealing equilibrium with pessimistic posture:
The DM receives a cue when α 2 =ᾱ and infers α 2 = α when no cue is sent. 22 Finally, in the absence of A 2 , the DM focuses all of her attention on A 1 : r * 1 = 1. Thus, for low enough f , the expert will fabricate A 2 to divert some of that attention. 22 If qR > 0, there exists a separating equilibrium in which the high type sends a cue. The DM reads this cue with some positive probability, which is high enough to deter the low type from sending a cue. The equilibrium is constructed such that the DM is indifferent between opening and not opening the cue. Mr. Putin may be encouraging speculation about his political future to enhance his influence-or to divert attention from more important matters like economic reform or the demographic crisis facing Russia. 23
In a similar vein, a Times article suggests that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then Iranian President, strategically diverted Western media coverage away from the country's domestic situation:
President Ahmadinejad also sought to grab the headlines and divert attention from the protests by announcing that Iran had produced its first stock of 20 percent-enriched uranium. He declared that Iran was now a "nuclear state." 24 Tactics like these, used by politicians to manipulate public opinion, have a name in public relations: spin. Two other well-known spin tactics are "bury bad news" and "wag the dog."
The former refers to the practice of releasing bad news in the shadow of other important news events. A revealing anecdote involves an UK government press officer, Jo Moore, who notoriously wrote, "It's now a very good day to get out anything we want to bury," in an email on September 11, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. 25 The latter refers to fashioning a salient issue for the purpose of diverting attention from another (minor) issue. Hard evidence for this is elusive, but allegations abound. For example, the satire "American Hero" claims that George H. W. Bush used the first Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, to divert attention from domestic issues and ensure reelection (Beinhart, 1994) ; the book was also the inspiration for "Wag the Dog," a movie in which a government spin-doctor fabricates a war to take the spotlight off a political sex scandal.
In rhetoric, a tactic of distraction is called a "red herring." A red herring is an irrelevant detail or issue raised to sidetrack a discussion. If successful, the discussants debate the red herring and disregard the original topic (Gula, 2007 
Obfuscation
In the next three settings, the DM communicates with one expert about just one action A. Multiple topics pertain to the decision under consideration. Attention manipulation still manifests in the way the expert steers the DM's attention towards, or away from, certain topics.
Suppose the DM's payoff from A can be expressed as the sum of N R components:x = N R 1x i . Each component takes the valuex > 0 with probability α i and otherwise the value
Similar to before, absent more information, the DM takes A if and only ifᾱ > α * ≡ −x x−x . Or put differently, if the DM can obtain more information, she uses an opt-in rule ifᾱ ≤ α * and an opt-out rule ifᾱ > α * .
In regard to communication, there exist N = N R + N ∅ topics related to the decision, but only N R of them are relevant to the DM's payoff. Crucially, I assume that the DM does not know which topics are relevant, and more, is potentially unaware of topics per se. This might seem peculiar, but it captures a plausible situation: Inclined towards a particular choice, the DM might yet discover aspects that change her opinion. Thus, the DM is faced with two sets of questions: What topics exist, and which ones are relevant (selection stage)? How much attention should a given topic receive (deliberation stage)?
The expert's communication incentives hinge on the DM's decision rule. If the DM follows an opt-in rule, the expert must persuade her to take the action. To maximize the chances that she revises her beliefs upwards, and so opts in, he seeks to draw her attention to those topics that are most likely to yield favorable information. That is, he sends cues about, and exerts persuasion effort on, the topics with the highest α i .
By contrast, if the DM follows an opt-out rule, the expert wants to withhold the relevant information. On his own accord, he would neither advertise nor explain anything of relevance, lest she change her mind and abandon the action after all. If the DM were bound to allocate attention to some relevant topics, the expert might advertise and exert effort on those relevant topics that are least likely to alter her decision. Intuitively, he would lure her attention towards topics that are-to him-the lesser evil. The fact that he prefers to talk about all and only irrelevant topics, in turn, implies that he has an incentive to supply irrelevant topics in the selection stage.
To show this, I assume N R = 1 and N ∅ is infinite, and that the DM can at most deliberate Proposition 4 (Obfuscation). Letᾱ > α * . Suppose the relevant cue is sent out. As q S → 0, the expert sends a swarm of irrelevant cues, and the DM's expected utility decreases.
The intuition behind this result is the same as for information overload, though the expert in the current setting benefits and hence induces it. If the DM lacks access to-or is unaware of-the relevant topic, the expert has no reason to bring it to her attention by sending a relevant cue. In fact, the expert is best off sending no cues at all. Now suppose a relevant cue, by mandate or by design, must be sent. In this case, the expert is afraid that the DM, by paying attention to the relevant topic, might discover unfavorable information about the action and abandon it.
To reduce the odds that the DM identifies, that is, selects the relevant topic, the expert now has an incentive to send out irrelevant cues (even though it is costly for him). A swarm of mostly irrelevant cues thwarts the DM's chance, and hence her incentives, to pinpoint the relevant topic. In other words, the expert intentionally evokes information overload to conceal relevant information. From a normative point of view, therefore, too much disclosure can be a concern as much as too little. A surfeit of details can prove as uninformative as a dearth thereof.
Complexity
Using a similar setting, I consider a related form of manipulation. Instead of obfuscating the DM with cues, the expert can now "design" A in a way that makes its payoff less transparent.
As before, the DM's payoff is-at least initially-the sum of N R components,x = N R 1x i , and each component takes the valuex > 0 with probability α i and otherwise the value x < 0.
However, the expert can now recompose the payoff structure into any formỹ = N 1ỹ j so long as the total (realized) payoff is invariant:ỹ =x. I callỹ a payoff-equivalent variation (ofx). Crucially, I assume that the DM does not know the "original" composition, {x i }. 27 In any case, absent communication, such variation does not matter; it affects neither the DM's decision nor her welfare.
27 Alternatively, I could assume that she does not know how a given payoff-relevant variation is related to the original composition. Either assumption captures situations of the following kind: A consumer is inclined to buy a good based on superficial information. That said, she is not aware of all aspects, such as hidden costs, that could influence her decision. Further, discovering one aspect is not necessarily informative about undiscovered ones.
As an illustration, consider two simple mathematical operations the expert can use to create payoff-equivalent variations. One is to divide eachx i into m parts, m h=1x ih =x i , so that the new payoff structure has N = mN R components:ỹ =
For example, instead of incorporating total expenses into one salient item, the monthly rent, a landlord might disaggregate them into various fees, such as for maintenance, utilities, move-in or move-out, parking, laundry room, or other administrative services. The other operation is to add components that neutralize each other, as inỹ =
j=1ỹ j where N = 3N R . A real-world example is a purchase involving nominal price, fees, taxes, discounts, bonuses, rewards, and so forth, which partly offset each other. In both examples, seeing one component is not informative about others.
Even if the total expected payoff remains unchanged, the payoff composition matters for That is, he would simplify the payoff structure and strive to explain.
By contrast, if the DM follows an opt-out rule, the expert wants to do the exact opposite.
He would increase the number of components, even if it were costly to do so, only to thwart learning. Suppose he must pay v > 0 to raise N by one.
Proposition 5 (Complexity). Letᾱ > α * . Suppose all relevant cues are sent out. As v → 0, the expert sets N → +∞, and the DM's expected utility falls to E (x).
As v → 0, the expert increases N such that more relevant information escapes the DM's attention, given that she can only deliberate on a limited number of components. At the same time, he disaggregates the payoff to reduce the amount of information she can possibly wrest from any given component. In the limit, even what she can learn from the components that she is capable of studying becomes so trivial that it no longer affects her decision: She chooses what she would have chosen without the information. Intuitively, the expert makes the action unnecessarily complex to prevent the DM from getting the full picture.
Example: Mandatory Disclosure and Product Regulation USA Today recently ran an internal study on the costs of maintaining a basic checking account at the ten largest 19 US banks and credit unions. While the most basic fees were found to be disclosed on the institutions' websites, many others were listed only in the "Schedule of Fees and Charges."
That, however, turned out to be difficult to find.
But even the world's largest search engine couldn't unearth a fee schedule for HSBC, TD Bank, Citibank and Capital One. To get their fee information, we had to e-mail or call the banks.
Determined customers can search for information about fees in banks' official disclosure documents, but they'll need a lot of time and a couple of cups of coffee,
too. An analysis of checking accounts for the 10 largest banks by the Pew Health
Group found that the median length of their disclosure statements was 111 pages.
None of the banks provided key information about fees on a single page... 28
Note that the issue was not only that the "inconvenient" information was at times unavailable.
It was also that, even when provided, it was made available in a way that made it costly to locate the relevant information. Ordinary customers would be hard-pressed to know not only Second, not even the most elaborate disclosure rule may be enough. Jacoby et al. (1974) begin their study on information overload with the question of whether simple disclosure rules like the Truth in Lending Act are effective if information overload poses a concern; this, I add, is a fortiori questionable given the threat of obfuscation. Even more unsettling, though, is that any regulation at the communication level proves futile if the sender can modify the object of communication in a way that makes it intellectually challenging to grasp, even with all details correctly disclosed. While the communication is correct, the matter to be decided becomes too complicated. In such a case, regulation might also want to target the object of communication, which is, as the examples illustrate, a much thornier issue.
Conclusion
This paper presents a theoretical framework that captures basic aspects of communication:
seeking, shunning, and vying for attention and, deliberately or not, distracting or confusing others. The main results-crowding out, information overload, distraction, obfuscation, and complexity-resonate with empirical findings in various social sciences. The key to micromodeling these phenomena is to proceed from the idea of attention allocation, namely split- A particularly interesting avenue, not pursued in the present paper, is that heterogeneity in attention constraints, or cognitive capacity, might provoke different forms or degrees of attention manipulation. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) posit that the poor are subject to tighter attention constraints than the rich, who can afford better technologies to free up attention. They then show that this induces differences in productivity that amplify the differences in initial endowment; inequality breeds more inequality. This paper's findings suggest that the problem may be even worse: The poor may not only start out with tighter attention constraints but also find their limited attention exploited, more so than the rich. In short, the tighter constraints may make them less productive and more manipulable. Manipulation is perhaps the more worrisome problem in that it is, as shown in this paper, prone to create externalities, and thus constrained inefficient outcomes. But such questions are left for future research. A Figures   Figure 1: Crowding out. The DM's attention devoted to Expert 1 in equilibrium, r * 1 (α 1 ), for a given α 2 , is nonmonotonic in Expert 1's attractiveness (left panel). This makes Expert 2's utility nonmonotonic in α 1 : When 2 desires attention (α 2 ≤ α * ), r * 1 (α 1 ) represents a negative externality on Expert 2, so EU Exp 2 (α 1 ) is negatively related to r * 1 (α 1 ) (middle panel). When Expert 2 does not desire attention (α 2 > α * ), r * 1 (α 1 ), represents a negative externality on Expert 2, so EU Exp 2 (α 1 ) is positively related to r * 1 (α 1 ) (right panel).
Figure 2: Information overload. A movement from right to left on the x-axis represents a decrease in the cost of entry. As q S decreases, the DM first benefits from an expansion in information supply (q S >q S ). Then, the DM has access to (at least) t high-quality experts, but no low-quality experts, so she obtains (decision) payoff U * . As the cost of entry falls below q S , low types join the battle for access, and the DM's expected utility falls below U * . When q S → 0, the number of low types who enter tends to infinity, so the DM ceases to screen experts. Her decision payoff falls, as she relies on lower quality of information on average. Thus, when information becomes cheap enough, the more information she gets, the less information she processes, and the worse she fares.
B Proofs
Proofs of Lemma 1, Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and Proposition 4: See Appendix C.
B.1 Proposition 2 (Information Overload)
I first establish a preliminary result, proven in Appendix C:
Lemma (Symmetric information outcome). Assume that the DM faces a cognitive constraint such that there exists a lower bound on the amount of (non-zero) attention that she can give to any one sender; r i ∈ {0} ∪ [r, 1] for all i. Denote by t (r) the highest number of senders that the DM can split her attention between if she splits her attention equally among them, given the cognitive constraint r. Assume that there are Nᾱ high types (α =ᾱ) and N α low types (α = α), with t (r) < Nᾱ << N α and α <ᾱ < α * . Under symmetric information, there is an (essentially unique) equilibrium in whcih the DM communicates with excatly t (r) high types.
The proof now proceeds in four steps.
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Claim B1.1 When q S ∈ q S ,q S , there exists a fully revealing equilibrium where only high-quality experts approach the DM. She obtains the same expected decision payoff as under perfect information.
Proof of Claim B1.1 We derive conditions under which equilibria with cue communication exist. We postulate an equilibrium such that P high types send cues to the DM , where t ≤ P ≤ Nᾱ, zero low types send a cue to the DM , and the DM devotes r * t = 1/t to t experts chosen randomly among the P high types who send a cue, where t ≡ t (r), and zero attention to all other experts. In such an equilibrium, a low type refrains from sending a cue iff
Exactly P high types send a cue iff
The fact that s * α 1 t is a high type's best reply implies that
By (4), (3) implies (2). Hence, if (3) is satisfied, the postulated equilibrium is incentive compatible for all experts. By (4), there exists a nonempty range of q S such that (3) is satisfied.
Because only high types send cues, an expert's cue communication decision reveals his type, so the DM need not assimilate the cues. By the proof of Claim 3, the DM 's preferred attention allocation is to communicate with t high types. She is indifferent between the P high types who send cues to her. Thus, randomizing between all experts who send her a cue, and devoting zero attention to all experts who do not, is incentive compatible for the DM .
Hence, the postulated FRE exists if (3) holds.
The FRE is such that all Nᾱ high types send cues in equilibrium (but, if there were Nᾱ +1 high types, the last one would not enter) when q S satisfies
The left-hand side of (5) gives the expected utility from entry in the presence of Nᾱ high types for a (hypothetical) (Nᾱ + 1)th high type. The expected utility from entry in the presence of of Nᾱ high types is strictly smaller for a low type. Thus, denoting this expected utility by q S , we have that
There exists a the FRE is such that all Nᾱ high types send cues in equilibrium (but no low types) when q S satisfies
The FRE is such that exactly t high types send cues in equilibrium (but no low types) when
Thus, FRE in which t or more high types (but no low types) send cues to the DM exist iff , low quality experts also approach the receiver. She must either accept a lower expected decision payoff, or intensify her search for high-quality senders. In either case, her expected utility is strictly lower than when q S ∈ q S ,q S .
Proof of Claim B1.2 We first show that when q S falls below q S , there exist only equilibria that make the DM strictly worse off than when q S ∈ q S ,q S .
When q S falls below q S , (6) is violated. Thus, in any equilibrium with cue communication, at least one low type sends a cue (and all high types). In such an equilibrium, the DM either (i) opens zero cues, but randomly chooses to communicate with t experts, or (ii) opens at least one cue. We show that both of these may be consistent with equilibrium play. We show this in the context of an equilibrium in which exactly one low type sends a cue.
If the DM plays strategy (i), the equilibrium must satisfy
where we use the fact that the DM will devote the same amount of attention to every expert with whom she communicates (as the experts' types are their private information). We denote by U ran R (Nᾱ, 1, t) the DM 's ex ante utility in this randomization equilibrium where Nᾱ high 28 types and one low type send cues to the DM who chooses t experts among them randomly.
We have that
where µ (Nᾱ, 1, t) is the probability that the (only) low type is among the t experts that the DM randomly picks from the Nᾱ + 1 available experts. Because µ (Nᾱ, 1, t) > 0,
If the DM instead plays strategy (ii), and if she commits to opening exactly one cue, her expected utility satisfies
With probability 1 Nᾱ+1 , the DM opens the cue sent by the (only) low type, in which case she communicates with the t high types and gets her preferred attention allocation. With probability Nᾱ Nᾱ+1 , the cue was sent by a high type, so the DM communicates with this expert and randomly picks (t − 1) others. In this case, her ex ante expected decision utility is greater than or equal toxᾱp s * α 1 t , 1 t + U ran R (Nᾱ − 1, 1, t − 1) (where the inequality is strict if the DM chooses to treat the identified high type preferentially, at the expense of dropping one expert of unknown type). Because the DM does not obtain her preferred attention allocation with probability one, U cue R (Nᾱ, 1) < U * R . We now show that both (i) and (ii) may, depending on the parameter values, be preferred by the DM :
In expectation, choosing t experts at random among Nᾱ +1 is stricly worse than observing one high type and choosing the other (t − 1) at random, i.e.,
−U ran R (Nᾱ, 1, t) > 0 Equation (7) implies that there exists a non-empty range of q R such that U cue R (Nᾱ, 1, t) > U ran R (Nᾱ, 1, t), given by
We now note that when the DM prefers a strategy in which she commits to opening exactly one cue to a strategy in which she randomizes, the DM also prefers a strategy in which she opens at least one cue to randomization. Thus, whenever (8) is satisfied, the DM opens at least one cue. Because the left-hand side of (8) is finite, the reverse is true for large enough q R , i.e., U cue R (Nᾱ, 1, t) < U ran R (Nᾱ, 1, t).
Claim B1.3 When q S → 0, the number of low quality experts who approach the DM becomes so large that she ceases to screen experts for quality. The DM's expected decision payoff is strictly smaller than that obtained in any equilibrium where cue communication takes place.
Proof of Claim B1.3 Suppose that N α is infinite. As q S → 0, the number of low types that wish to send a cue to the DM , n, approaches infinity, which implies that Nα Nᾱ+n → 1 and
, the DM stricly prefers not to open any cue in the limit. In an equilibrium in which she randomizes, she is worse off, the larger the share of low type experts. Thus, she is clearly worse off than in any equilibrium where she reads cues. Claim C1.1 When α 1 , α 2 ≤ α * , there exists a unique, interior equilibrium (r * 1 , s * 1 , s * 2 ) ∈ (0, 1) 3 of this game.
Proof of Claim C1.1 When α 1 , α 2 ≤ α * , the problem of S i , i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
For a given (conjectured) r 1 , S i 's first-order condition is given by The problem of the DM is given by
For given (conjectured) s 1 and s 2 , her first-order conditions (FOCs) are given bȳ
wherex > 0.
We substitute the experts best reply functions from (9) into (10) and obtain
An equilibrium which is interior must satisfy (11). We will now discuss existence and uniqueness of equilibria in this communication game.
First, we show that p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ) is monotonically decreasing in r 1 , i.e., that its derivative is negative. Differentiating p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ) with respect to r 1 yields
Differentiating sender 1's equilibrium condition, (9), with respect to r 1 yields
Inserting (13) into (12) yields that the derivative of p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ) is negative if and only if
Using the fact that (c (s * 1 (r 1 )) − dα i p 11 (s * 1 (r 1 ))) is strictly positive, we rearrange to obtain
, r 1 ) c (s * 1 (r 1 )) > 0, this condition is implied by global concavity. This establishes that p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ) is monotonically decreasing in r 1 . Second, we show that there exists a unique interior equilbrium. Defining g(r 1 ) ≡ p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ) and h(r 1 ) ≡ p 2 (s * 2 (1 − r 1 ) , 1 − r 1 ) we rewrite (11) as
( 1 4 )
Step 1 of this proof established that g (r 1 ) is decreasing. An analogous argument establishes that h (r 2 ) = h (1 − r 1 ) is decreasing in r 2 = 1 − r 1 (increasing in r 1 ). Further, because g (r 1 ) = p 2 (s * 1 (r 1 ) , r 1 ), the Indada condition
yields that g (r 1 ) > 0 for all r 1 ∈ [0, 1) and g (r 1 ) → 0 as r 1 → 1 (16) h (r 2 ) > 0 for all r 2 ∈ [0, 1) and h (r 2 ) → 0 as r 2 → 1, where the latter can be re-written
By (16), when r 1 tends to one, LHS of (14) tends to zero and RHS is strictly greater than zero. By (17), when r 1 tends to zero, RHS tends to zero and LHS is strictly greater than zero. Thus, there exists an interior equilibrium r * 1 ∈ (0, 1), as these must cross. Moreover, they cross at most once, so the solution r * 1 is unique. By arguments analogous to those above, second-order condition is satisfied.
From the above two steps, we have that the unique interior equilibrium is given by
3 , where r * 1 ∈ (0, 1) is the solution derived above, s * 1 = s * 1 (r * 1 ), and s * 2 = s * 2 (1 − r * 1 ). Third, we show that there exists no equilbrium in which the DM devotes all her attention to only one of the experts. Suppose that there exists some equilibrium in which r * i = 0 for some S i , w.l.o.g. for S 1 . However, (15) yields that, for any s 1 , ∂p(s 1 ,r 1 ) ∂r 1
→ 0 as r 1 → 1 and ∂p(s 2 ,r 2 ) ∂r 2
> 0 as r 1 → 1. Thus, r * i = 0 cannot be optimal for the DM . Note that this is the case even if s * 1 = 1.
Claim C1.2 When α 2 ≤ α * < α 1 , there exists a unique equilibrium (r * 2 , s * 2 , 0).
Proof of Claim C1.2 When α 1 > α * and α 2 ≤ α * , S 1 's problem is given by
Because the first-order derivative w.r.t. s 1 is negative, s * 1 = 0. The problem of S 2 is identical to the experts' problem in the case when α 1 , α 2 ≤ α * above. Thus, S 2 's (unique) best reply function s * 2 ( r 2 ) is monotonically increasing if p 12 > 0 and monotonically decreasing if p 12 < 0.
The problem of the DM is given by
For given (conjectured) s 1 and s 2 , her first-order conditions (FOCs) are given by
We substitute in the experts' best reply functions and obtain
(1 − r 1 ) , 1 − r 1 ) .
( 1 8 ) Because −x (1 − α 1 ) > 0 and p 2 (0, r 1 ) is decreasing in r 1 , LHS of (18) is decreasing in r 1 .
Replicating the steps in the proof of case 1 above establishes that RHS is increasing in r 1 .
As the Inada conditions stated in the proof of case 1 are defined for all s 1 ∈ [0, 1], and hence for s 1 = 0, an analogous argument yields that there exists a unique solution r * 1 ∈ (0, 1) to (18). Thus, there exists a unique interior equilbrium (r * 2 , s * 2 , s * 1 ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 ∪ {0} of this game.
Moreover, replicating the steps in the proof of case 1 establishes that there exist no equilibrium in which r * i = 0 for some i. We note that in this equilibrium, the DM engages in (one-sided) information acquisition relating to A 1 , i.e. she devotes some attention to this project even though S 1 does not make any communication effort. In contrast, DM and S 2 engage in two-sided communication. {α 1x + (1 − α 1 ) x − p (s 1 , r 1 ) (1 − α 1 ) x + α 2x + (1 − α 2 ) x − p (s 2 , 1 − r 1 ) (1 − α 2 ) x} .
For given (conjectured) s 1 and s 2 , her first-order conditions (FOCs) are given by ⇔ −x (1 − α 1 ) p 2 ( s 1 , r 1 ) = −x (1 − α 2 ) p 2 ( s 2 , 1 − r 1 ) .
(1 − α 1 ) p 2 (0, r 1 ) = (1 − α 2 ) p 2 (0, 1 − r 1 ) .
( 1 9 )
An analogous argument to those in the proofs of Claim 1 and Claim 2 yields that there exists a unique solution r * 1 ∈ (0, 1) to (19).
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Proof of Claim C4.1 The problem of S i , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nᾱ} is characterized in the proof of Lemma 1, and S i 's unique best reply function is given by s * i ( r i ) ∈ (0, 1). By symmetry, s * 1 (·) = ... = s * Nᾱ (·) ≡ s * (·). 
Substituting the experts' best reply functions into this condition yields ∂p (s * (r 1 ) , r 1 )
Clearly, r * 1 = r * 2 = r * 3 = ... = r * Nᾱ ≡ r * satisfies (20). Because the DM exhausts her attention constraint in any equilibrium, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, given by (r * , s * ) = There exists no asymmetric interior equilibrium (where r * i > 0 for all i and r * i = r * j for some i, j such that i = j). To see this, define g(r i ) ≡ p 2 (s * (r i ) , r i ). By the proof of Lemma 1, g (r i ) is strictly increasing in r i . Hence, if r * i = r * j for some i, j such that i = j, (20) must be violated.
There exists no equilibrium such that r * i = 0 for some i. This follows directly from (i) for all s i ∈ [0, 1] :
> 0 for all r i ∈ (0, 1), (ii)
∂p(s i ,r i ) ∂r i
→ 0 as r i → 1, and (iii)
→ ∞ as r i → 0.
Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of this game.
Claim C4.2 Assume that the DM faces a cognitive constraint such that there exists a lower bound on the amount of (non-zero) attention that she can give to any one sender; r i ∈ {0} ∪ [r, 1] for all i. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium of this game, in which r * i = 1 t(r) , where t (r) is the highest number of senders that the DM can split her attention between, given the cognitive constraint r.
Proof of Claim C4.2 In the unconstrained optimum derived in the proof of Claim 1, as Nᾱ increases, r * = 1 Nᾱ ≡ r * (Nᾱ) decreases monotonically. Thus, there exists some integer t (r) such that r * (t (r)) > r > r * (t (r) + 1). By the proof of Claim 1, the DM strictly prefers to communicate with t (r) senders over communicating with strictly fewer senders. Because the DM exhausts her attention constraint in any optimum, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, given by (r * , s * ) = 1 t , s * 1 t , where s * 1 t is a vector (s * 1 , ..., s * t ) such that s * i = s * 1 t for all i. This implies that the DM fares worse in an equilibrium where less than t high type experts enter than in an equilibrium where t (or more) high types enter.
Claim C4.3 Assume that the DM faces a cognitive constraint r and that there are Nᾱ high types (α =ᾱ) and N α low types (α = α), with t (r) < Nᾱ << N α . Under symmetric information, the DM communicates with t (r) high types.
Proof of Claim C4.3 Becauseᾱ > α, and because the DM 's expected utilility from communication with an expert is increasing in the expert's type (α), the DM 's expected utility from devoting attention r = 1/t (r) to a high type is higher than her expected utility from devoting the same amount of attention to a low type. Because t (r) < Nᾱ, the DM only communicates with high types. By the proof of Claim 2, the DM communicates with exactly t (r) high types.
C.5 Proposition 4
Claim C5.1 If the DM assimilates one cue, she continues to assimilate cues until she identifies the relevant topic.
Proof of Claim C5.1 Suppose that the DM has launched k topics. Consider the first cue that the DM assimilates. She incurs the cost q R . With probability 1/k, she finds the relevant topic, and devotes all of her attention to this topic. With probability (k − 1)/k she does not find the relevant topic. In this situation, the DM always assimilates a second cue: the cost of assimilation is still q R ; however, the probaility that she identifies the relevant topic is 1/(k − 1) > 1/k. Hence, if the DM assimilated the first cue, she assimilates a second cue in the even that the first topic is irrelevant. Repeating this argument yields that she, if she assimilates one cue, continues to assimilate cues until she finds the relevant topic.
Claim C5.2 There exists a number of cues (topics) k * such that, if the DM obtains more than k * topics, then she assimilates no cue. Instead, she randomly chooses t topics that she divides her attention between (equally) in the deliberation stage.
